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Abstract—Smart meters (SMs) share fine-grained electricity
consumption of households with utility providers almost in real-
time. This can violate the users’ privacy since sensitive informa-
tion is leaked through the SMs data. In this study, a novel privacy-
aware method which exploits the availability of a rechargeable
battery (RB) is proposed. It is based on a Markov decision process
(MDP) formulation in which the reward received by the agent is
designed to control the trade-off between privacy and electricity
cost. To obtain a robust and general privacy measure, we adopt
the mutual information (MI) between the user’s demand load and
the masked load seen by the grid. Unlike previous studies, we
model the whole temporal correlation in the data to estimate the
MI in its general form. The training of the agent is done using a
model-free deep reinforcement learning algorithm known as the
deep double Q-learning (DDQL) method. In order to estimate
the MI-based privacy signal, a neural network termed the H-
network is included in the scheme. The performance of the
DDQL-MI algorithm is assessed empirically using actual SMs
data and compared with simpler privacy measures. The results
show significant improvements over the state-of-the-art privacy-
aware SMs methods.
Index Terms—Smart meters privacy, Information-theoretical
privacy, Mutual information, Deep reinforcement learning, Deep
double Q-learning.
I. Introduction
A. Motivation
SMART Meters (SMs) are a key component of the so-called advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), which is
a critical subsystem of smart grids (SGs) [1]. SMs are capable
of measuring the electricity consumption of users at a fine-
grained level and share that with the utility provider (UP) in
almost real-time.This huge amount of data provides immense
opportunities for both customers and operators, leading to the
emergence of the new field of SMs data analytics [2]. How-
ever, SMs data also contain sensitive information about users
which could easily be inferred by malicious third-parties or
attackers if no preventive measures are taken. For instance, an
eavesdropper can apply non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM)
methods to infer the user’s presence at home [3] and even the
types of appliances being used at a specific time [4]. Therefore,
the massive deployment and adoption of SMs necessitate the
development of efficient privacy-aware strategies for the time-
series data sharing to keep the user’s sensitive information
private against potential attackers.
B. Related work
A substantial amount of studies on SMs privacy were
conducted, which can be classified in two main families: (i)
SMs data manipulation techniques [5]–[11]; and (ii) user’s
demand load shaping approaches [12]–[22]. On the one hand,
in the first family of methods, the consumers’ load data are
manipulated by a noisy transformation before sharing it to the
UP. In this setting, there is a trade-off between the distortion
or utility of the data and privacy guarantees. On the other
hand, in the second family of privacy-aware techniques, the
actual electricity consumption of the users, as seen by the
grid (i.e., the grid load), are shaped using a combination of
different physical resources such as a rechargeable battery
(RB), electric vehicles (EVs), heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) units, and renewable energy sources
(RES). Note that, in this scenario, the consumer load is
different than the grid load (e.g., the grid load can be higher
than the consumer load if an RB is being charged). The goal
of these methods is to mask the consumer load but, at the
same time, efficiently use the available resources considering
their physical constraints and wear and tear, as well as a
possibly time-varying electricity rate. In this framework, there
is generally a trade-off between the electricity expenses and
privacy guarantees.
In some recent studies, physical resources are used to
minimize the average relative difference between the grid load
and a constant (or piecewise constant to accommodate a time-
varying energy price) target load [20]–[22], i.e., to flatten
the electricity consumption reported by the SMs. In [22],
following the formulation in [21], the SMs privacy problem
is cast as a Markov decision process (MDP) and a model-
free deep reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm known as the
deep double Q-learning (DDQL) method is used to tackle this
MDP problem. Even though this framework has been shown
to be useful in limiting the leakage of sensitive information,
the effectiveness of the flatness-based privacy measure remains
unclear.
A formal privacy measure from information theory known
as the mutual information (MI), between the user’s demand
load and reported grid load, was proposed in [6] and has
since been adopted in several works [14], [15], [17], [18].
In [18], the SMs information-theoretic privacy is formulated
as an MDP and the optimum policy is obtained numerically
using dynamic programming, assuming full knowledge of
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2the MDP. Besides, for a simplified scenario in which the
demand load is assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), a single-letter expression for the average
information leakage is obtained. However, since electricity
cost is not included in the formulation, the cost-privacy trade-
off is not characterized. Besides, these methods are not directly
applicable in practice since the MDP is not fully-known due
to the unknown dynamics of the demand load.
C. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is to incorporate the
MI between the user’s demand load and grid load as a privacy
measure in a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework,
and show the practical advantages of this approach in terms
of the privacy-cost trade-off. For this purpose, we adopt the
DDQL algorithm, applied in [22] to this problem, which uses
two neural networks (the Q-network and the target-network) to
learn an optimal policy for shaping the consumer’s load using
actual SMs data. Starting from the MI, we derive the privacy
signal and propose to use a new neural network (referred
to as the H-network) to estimate it during the training of
the DRL agent. Interestingly, based on the structure of this
network, we can use either a general MI privacy measure or a
simplified MI privacy measure based on an i.i.d. assumption.
This latter case is an important benchmark as it allows us
to quantify the importance of the time correlation in the
privacy measure estimation process. We study the empirical
information leakage rate versus electricity cost trade-off and
compare both MI-based privacy measures with the flatness-
based privacy measure. In addition, the performance of this
new framework is assessed in two practical scenarios: (i) an
attacker aiming to infer the actual consumer load; and (ii) an
attacker trying to infer the house occupancy status.
D. Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we review the MDP formulation of the privacy-aware
demand shaping problem. Then, in Section III, we review
two commonly used privacy measures and discuss how to use
MI as a privacy measure in the MDP framework. We also
discuss why MI is a superior privacy measure as compared
with the flatness-based one. The novel DDQL-MI algorithm
is then presented in Section IV. The numerical performance of
the DDQL-MI algorithm using actual SMs data is studied in
Section V, where we show the impact of the privacy measure
choice on the results. Some concluding remarks close the
paper in Section VI.
II. Problem Formulation
Notation and conventions
For the definition of basic information-theoretic concepts,
including mutual information and entropy, we refer the reader
to [23]. Below, we briefly summarize the notation and con-
ventions used in this work:
• yT = (y1, y2, . . . , yT ): Time series data of length T ;
• I
(
yT ; zT
)
: Mutual information (MI) between time series
yT and zT ;
• H(y): Entropy of the random variable y;
• H(y|z): Conditional entropy of the random variable y
given z;
• Ey[.]: Expectation with respect to the probability distri-
bution of the random variable y;
• Epi[.]: Expectation with respect to all random variables
involved and considering a fixed policy pi;
• p(y): The probability distribution of y;
• [y]+ = max(y, 0);
• log(.): The base-2 logarithm function;
A. Demand shaping using physical resources
Consider the smart metering system model represented in
Fig. 1 where an intelligent agent, named as privacy-cost
management unit (PCMU), is designed to hide the household
demand load using a rechargeable battery (RB) while keeping
the total electricity cost minimum. It should be noted that other
physical resources can also be incorporated in our framework
as in other works [19], [21].
Fig. 1. Privacy-aware demand shaping framework for smart meters based on
a rechargeable battery.
Let yt denote the consumer’s demand load/power, i.e. the
total power demanded by the appliances at time t, zt the load
received from the grid, and `ocRB,t ∈ [0, 1] the level of charge
of battery (normalized by the capacity of the battery), where
t ∈ T = {1, . . . ,T }. Given the demand load yt and the level
of charge available in the battery `ocRB,t at time t, the PCMU
needs to determine the optimal charging/discharging rate of
the battery qRB,t to physically distort the actual demand load,
so that the reported load zt, given by
zt = yt + qRB,t, (1)
does not reveal information about the user’s demand load
yt. The goal of the PCMU is to limit the performance of
a potential attacker trying to violate the user’s privacy by
inferring sensitive information (which could be either the
actual demand load yt or a correlated variable of interest to the
attacker) from zt. To make this precise, we first introduce the
Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation of the problem.
3B. Markov decision process (MDP) model
Following previous studies, such as [18], [19], [21], the
problem of finding the optimal policy for the agent (i.e.,
the PCMU) is formulated as a Markov decision process
(MDP) to capture the agent-environment interaction (see
Fig. 2). Any MDP problem is determined by the tuples(S,A(s), p(st+1|st, at), r(st, at), γ) as follows [24]:
• State space S, which determines all the possible states
that the agent could be in.
• Action space A(s), which determines the feasible actions
the agent can take at state s ∈ S.
• Environment dynamics p(st+1|st, at), which shows how
the state st evolves to st+1 by taking action at.
• Reward function r(st, at), which is the immediate reward
obtained due to taking action at at state st.
• Discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1], which is the decay constant of
future rewards and therefore determines their importance
to the agent.
In this study, we assume a fixed finite horizon, i.e., T < ∞ is
a constant. Therefore, the PCMU starts from an initial state s1,
and by following a policy pi(a|s) = p(a|s), takes the first action
a1. As a consequence of the action a1, the PCMU receives the
reward r1 from the (artificial) environment and transitions to
the state s2 (see Fig. 2). Thereby, this gives rise to a trajectory
of states, actions and rewards [s1, a1, r1, . . . , sT , aT , rT ], which
is referred to as an episode.
Fig. 2. Agent-Environment interaction in an MDP [24].
One general approach to find the optimum policy is via the
action-value function Q : S × A → R, which is defined as
follows:
Q(s, a) = Epi
 T∑
t=1
γt−1r (st, at)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ s1 = s, a1 = a
 , (2)
where the subscript in the expectation emphasizes that it is a
function of the policy pi chosen by the agent. The action-value
function represents the expected cumulative reward received
by the agent when it starts at some state s ∈ S, takes an
action a ∈ A(s), and then follows the policy pi. Therefore,
an optimal policy pi∗ can be obtained by maximizing Q(s, a)
over all possible policies for all pairs (s, a) ∈ S × A(s). We
use Q∗ to denote the optimal state-action value function, that
is, Q∗(s, a) = maxpi Q(s, a). It is well-known that, for any
MDP, there always exists at least one optimal policy which is
deterministic. Assuming uniqueness for the sake of simplicity
of presentation, we can write the optimal policy as follows:
pi∗(a|s) =
 1 if a = argmaxa∈A(s) Q
∗(s, a),
0 otherwise.
(3)
In our framework, the state at time t is defined as
st = [`ocRB,t, yt]T , and the action is defined as the charg-
ing/discharging rate of the battery, i.e. at = qRB,t, where a
positive qRB,t indicates that the RB is charging and a negative
qRB,t means discharging of RB. For this MDP, the environment
transition probability p(st+1|st, at) can be written as follows:
p
(
st+1|st, at) (i)= p (`ocRB,t+1|`ocRB,t, qRB,t) × p (yt+1|yt) (4)
where (i) is due to the assumption that the consumer’s demand
load is independent of the action and level of charge of
battery. The factor p
(
`ocRB,t+1|`ocRB,t, qRB,t
)
is determined by
the dynamics and physical constraints of the battery, which
can be summarized as follows [21]:
qminRB ≤ qRB,t ≤ qmaxRB , (5)
`ocRB,t+1 = `ocRB,t +
qRB,t × ∆t × eRB
CRB
, (6)
`ocminRB ≤ `ocRB,t ≤ `ocmaxRB , (7)
where qminRB and q
max
RB are the minimum and maximum charg-
ing/discharging rate of the RB, `ocminRB and `oc
max
RB are the
minimum and maximum level of charge of the RB, ∆t is the
load sampling rate, eRB is the charging efficiency factor of the
RB, and CRB is the capacity of the RB. It should be noted
that p
(
yt+1|yt) is unknown and, in general, it is difficult to
estimate accurately [21]. To get rid of this issue, the focus of
this study would be on the free-model RL algorithms which
do not require full knowledge of the environment dynamics.
Finally, we need to define the reward function, which will
guide the agent to learn an optimal policy. For our purposes,
it should be an appropriate combination of the privacy and the
associated electricity cost. Following [21], the reward function
is inversely interpreted as a loss function: ` (st, at) = −r (st, at).
Assuming a privacy signal f (st, at) and an electricity cost
signal g(st, at), the one-step loss function can be defined as
follows:
` (st, at) = −r (st, at) = λg(st, at) + (1 − λ) f (st, at), (8)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] controls the privacy-cost trade-off. Concretely,
for λ = 0 the goal of the agent will be to minimize the
expected cumulative privacy signal, while for λ = 1 it will
be to minimize the expected cumulative energy cost. As λ is
reduced, the PCMU should be able to provide the consumer
a higher privacy level but at the expense of an increase
in the energy cost. Studying this trade-off and its practical
implications is of fundamental importance to properly design
the PCMU. Notice that, using (2) and (8), we can decompose
the action-value function as follows:
Q(s, a) = λQc(s, a) + (1 − λ)Qp(s, a), (9)
where Qc(s, a) = −Epi[∑Tt=1 γt−1g(st, at) |s1 = s, a1 = a] and
Qp(s, a) = −Epi[∑Tt=1 γt−1 f (st, at) |s1 = s, a1 = a] are the cost
and privacy action-value functions, respectively.
The total cost associated with this privacy-aware framework
can be due to the electricity cost and also to the cost related
to the battery wear and tear. Considering for simplicity that
4no energy can be sold to the grid by the users, the electricity
cost at time t can be computed as follows:
ct = ∆t ht [zt]+ , (10)
where ht is the price of purchasing 1 kWh of energy from the
grid at time t. Since
[zt]+ = max(zt, 0) ≤ |zt | ≤ yt +
∣∣∣qRB,t∣∣∣ , (11)
and yt is not controlled by the PCMU, we define the electricity
cost signal as
g(st, at) = ∆t ht |qRB,t |. (12)
Two important remarks follow. First, since ct ≤ g(st, at), this
electricity cost signal effectively limits the actual electricity
cost. Second, this definition of g(st, at) incidentally takes into
account the battery wear and tear cost, since it grows as the
battery use increases.
The privacy signal design is discussed in detail in the next
section.
III. Privacy Measures: Flatness and Mutual Information
In the following, two different privacy measures will be
reviewed and discussed: the flatness privacy measure and the
MI privacy measure.
A. Flatness privacy measure
In [21], the privacy signal received by the RL agent when
at state st and taking action at is defined as
f (st, at) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ zt − lclc
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (13)
where lc is a constant target level. This encourages the agent
to take actions such that, on average, zt is as close as possible
to lc. Although simple to compute and intuitively appealing,
the problem with this quantity is that it does not capture the
statistical dependence between yT and zT and therefore fails to
be a satisfactory privacy measure. As a very simple example
to illustrate this fact, consider a PCMU with the following
strategy: zt = αyt + lc for all t ∈ T , where α ∈ R is a constant.
In this case, the privacy action-value function is
Qp(s, a) = −E
 T∑
t=1
γt−1|α| |yt ||lc|
∣∣∣∣∣∣ s1 = s, a1 = a
 ∝ −|α|, (14)
that is, Qp(s, a) is proportional to −|α|. If α = 0, we have
Qp(s, a) = 0 as expected. In such scenario, zT is constant and
it does not provide any information to infer the actual value
of yT . In other words, full privacy is achieved. However, for
any α , 0, the variables yt and zt are maximally correlated
(i.e., the correlation coefficient between zt and yt is either 1
or -1 depending on the sign of α) and the task of inferring yt
from zt is trivial (assuming the attacker is able to estimate only
two parameters). Therefore, all these cases can be considered
equivalent from the privacy point of view, but Qp(s, a) can
take any value in (−∞, 0) as |α| is modified. Thus, the
flatness privacy measure can be completely misleading in some
scenarios. This problem is illustrated in Fig. 3, clearly showing
the limitations of the flatness privacy measure.
Fig. 3. Demand load and grid load when zt = αyt + lc, where α = 0.2 and
lc = 0.7.
B. Mutual information privacy measure
1) General Case: A much stronger privacy measure, pro-
posed in [6] for the SMs privacy problem, and used since in
several works [14], [15], [17], [18], is the MI between the
demand load and the grid load, which is defined as follows:
I(yT ; zT ) = EyT ,zT
log p(yT , zT )p(yT )p(zT )
 . (15)
Intuitively, MI measures the degree of dependence between zT
and yT and is zero if and only if zT and yT are statistically
independent. It is also upper bounded by H(yT ), the entropy of
yT , and equal to that value if and only if yT is a deterministic
function of zT [25]. These standard properties of MI show
why this quantity is satisfactory as a privacy measure. In fact,
revisiting the previous example, in which zT = αyT + lc, it
readily follows that
I(yT ; zT ) =
{
0 if α = 0,
H(yT ) otherwise. (16)
This means that full privacy is achieved only for the α = 0
case and other choices lead to a maximal information leakage.
Recall from (8) that, in order to define the loss or the reward
signal, we need to find the (random) privacy signal received
by the agent when it is at state st and takes action at. To do
so, we first rewrite the MI as follows:
I(yT ; zT ) =
T∑
t=1
[
H(yt |yt−1) − H(yt |yt−1, zT )
]
. (17)
Notice that the first term is a constant, independent of the
PCMU strategy, so it can be discarded. On the other hand,
using the definition of conditional entropy and the law of
total expectation, the second term inside the summation can
be written as follows:
− H(yt |yt−1, zT ) = Est ,at [Eyt ,zT |st ,at [log p(yt |yt−1, zT )]]. (18)
Notice that the inner conditional expectation is an explicit
function of st and at, as required. Therefore, we define the
privacy function as follows:
f (st, at) = Eyt ,zT |st ,at [log p(yt |yt−1, zT )]. (19)
With this definition, the expected cumulative privacy signal
over an episode is equal to the MI up to an additive constant.
Notice that to recover the MI exactly we need to set γ = 1,
i.e., do not discount future rewards.
5The expectation operation appearing in (19) can be readily
estimated based on previous experience of the agent using a
Monte Carlo approach. However, to approximate this privacy
signal, we also need to estimate the conditional distributions
p(yt |yt−1, zT ) for each t ∈ T . To do so, we shall use a
“helper” recurrent neural network (RNN) which we term the
H-network. Note that, unlike (13), this privacy measure is
non-causal as it involves the whole sequence zT at each t.
However, since training is done offline, this is not an issue for
its implementation. It should be emphasized at this point that,
once a policy is learned, the agent will act according to it in
a fully causal manner.
2) I.I.D. case: In order to understand the role of the
correlation in time of the time series yT and zT , we also
consider, as a benchmark, the case in which yT is assumed
to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and we
model the transformation between yt and zt as memoryless
but arbitrary, i.e., zt = g(yt) where g is a fixed random
transformation. Although this assumption clearly does not hold
in our MDP framework nor in practice, it is interesting to
study this scenario to assess the importance of taking into
account the correlations across time for the privacy measure
computation. Note that, in this case, zT is also i.i.d. In such a
case, it can be shown that:
I(yT ; zT ) =
T∑
t=1
I(yt; zt) = T I(y; z) = T [H(y) − H(y|z)], (20)
where we have omitted the time dependence since all the pairs
(yt, zt) are assumed to be i.i.d. and therefore all the terms are
equal. Similarly as before, noting the relation
− H(y|z) = Es,a[Ey,z|s,a[log p(y|z)]], (21)
we can define the privacy signal simply as
f (s, a) = Ey,z|s,a[log p(y|z)]. (22)
Therefore, the task of the H-network in this case is to estimate
p(y|z), which is considered a time-invariant distribution.
Note that, in general, this will not provide a control over
the value of I(yT ; zT ). In fact, by using the standard properties
of MI, it can be shown that
I(yT ; zT ) ≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
I(yt; zt). (23)
In summary, the i.i.d. assumption leads to using a lower bound
on the MI as a privacy measure and therefore, in theory, does
not offer real privacy guarantees.
IV. Methodology
A. Review of CQL algorithm
The classical Q-Learning (CQL) algorithm is a simple
method to learn the optimal state-action value function Q∗ by
updating the action-value of the experienced state-action pairs.
The algorithm can be summarized by the following update
equation:
∆Q (st, at) = α
(
r (st, at) + γ max
a∈A(st+1)
Q (st+1, a) − Q (st, at)
)
,
(24)
where α is the step size parameter. Details on the training
process and convergence properties of the CQL method can
be found in [24]. The CQL algorithm was used for smart meter
privacy in [21]. However, the main drawback of this method
is that it needs to visit all the state-action pairs several times
to provide a good approximation of Q∗. Therefore, for large
MDPs with many states and actions, convergence is usually
very slow.
B. The DDQL-MI algorithm
To solve the slow convergence problem of the CQL al-
gorithm, the Q-function can be approximated by using a
deep neural network (DNN). These new methods, where
deep learning is used for approximating the Q-function, are
called deep Q-Learning (DQL) methods [26], [27]. A general
diagram presenting the agent-environment interaction under
the DQL paradigm and our context is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Schematic of the agent-environment interaction in the DQL framework
where the Q-function is approximated with a deep neural network.
In a recent work, a robust DQL method called deep double
Q-learning (DDQL) algorithm [28] was used for the first time
for the smart meter privacy problem [22] using the flatness
privacy signal defined in (13) (from now on, we will refer to
this method as Model I). The main idea of the DQL method is
to approximate Q∗(s, a) ≈ Q(s, a; θ) where θ are the parameters
of a DNN called the Q-network. The Q-network takes the
state s ∈ S at the input and generates Q(s, a) at the output
for different actions a ∈ A. To define the objective function
for this Q-network, we observe from (24) that convergence is
obtained when the quantity in parenthesis is equal to zero. The
term r (st, at) +γ maxa∈A(st+1)Q (st+1, a; θ) can be interpreted as
the target, while the term Q (st, at; θ) is the output of the Q-
network. Thus, the mean squared error loss between target
and output can be used as the loss function for training the
Q-network. However, using the same network to compute the
target and output often leads to instability [29]. To address this
issue, the so-called double Q-learning algorithm was proposed
in [30] and extended to the deep learning setting in [28]. In the
DDQL algorithm, a second network called the target-network
(with parameters θ′) is used to calculate the target term.
The target-network parameters θ′ are periodically updated by
simply copying the parameters from the Q-network. Thus,
using the target-network, the objective function of the Q-
6network can be written as follows:
LQN(θ) =E
[(
r(st, at) + γ max
a∈A(st+1)
Q(st+1, a; θ′) − Q(st, at; θ)
)2]
.
(25)
The expectation is approximated by a Monte Carlo approach
using a replay buffer [27]. Fig. 5 presents the schematic of the
DDQL method and its training process.
The DDQL-MI method is obtained by including the H-
network, as discussed in Section III-B, to estimate the condi-
tional probability distributions p(yt |yt−1, zT ), t ∈ T , which are
required to compute the privacy signal (19) in the general case.
In addition, a second replay buffer is used to approximate the
expectation in (19). Recall that, for the simplified i.i.d. case,
the only modification required is in the H-network structure,
which only needs to estimate p(y|z), as shown in (22). The
training of the DDQL-MI method is presented in Algorithm 1
below. The DDQL-MI algorithm will be referred to as Model
II in the following.
Fig. 5. Schematic of the DDQL algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Training of the DDQL-MI algorithm.
1: Initialize Q-network, target-network, and H-network.
2: Initialize f (st , at) for all t ∈ T = {1, . . . ,T }.
3: Initialize `ocRB,1 = 0.
4: for number of training episodes do
5: Set the initial state s1 = [`ocRB,1, y1].
6: for t = 1, . . . ,T do
7: Observe the state st = [`ocRB,t , yt].
8: Select a feasible action at using the −greedy algorithm.
9: Calculate reward r(st , at) from equation (8).
10: Update the next state st+1 based on (6), (7) and observing yt+1.
11: Import (st , at , r(st , at), st+1) into the replay buffer I.
12: Every k′ step, update the Q-network by minimizing (25),
approximated using samples from the replay buffer I.
13: Every k step, update the target-network by copying from
Q-network parameters.
14: Every k step, update the H-network and then estimate f (st , at) for
all t ∈ T = {1, . . . ,T } using samples from the replay buffer II.
15: end for
16: Import (zT , yT ) into the replay buffer II.
17: end for
Note: The copy step k and training step k′ are hyperparameters.
V. Results and Discussion
A. Description of data set and parameters
In this study, we have used a public dataset known as
the electricity consumption and occupancy (ECO) dataset. It
was published by [31] and includes 1 Hz electricity usage
measured by SMs along with the occupancy labels of five
houses in Switzerland. The measurements sampling rate is
chosen as ∆t = 15 min, and episodes with the length of a
day are considered. In total, 2700 samples (each a vector of
length T = 96) are used and split into training, validation, and
test with ratio 70:10:20, respectively. For the flatness privacy
measure, the desired constant load is set to lc = 0.7 kW. The
following values are considered for the parameters of the RB:
CRB = 10 kWh, eRB = 1, qmaxRB = −qminRB = 4kW, `ocmaxRB = 1 and
`ocminRB = 0. For the electricity cost calculations, the winter
time-of-use tariff offered by Ontario/Canada is used, where
the off-peak price is $0.101 kWh during 19:00 to 7:00, the
mid-peak price is $0.144 kWh during 11:00 to 17:00, and the
on-peak price is $0.208 kWh during 7:00 to 11:00 and during
17:00 to 19:00.
B. Mutual information versus flat load as privacy
In this section, the results of applying Model I and Model II
to the ECO dataset are presented. In both cases, a multilayer
perceptron (MLP) with two hidden layers, each including
64 neurons and rectified linear unit (ReLU) as activation
functions, is used for both the Q-network and the target-
network. The discount factor γ is set as 0.99 and the size
of the experience replay memory is 10K tuples. The memory
gets sampled to update the Q-network every 8 steps (k′ = 8),
with minibatches of size 128, and a target-network copy step
k of 500 steps. The RMSProp optimizer with a learning rate
equal to 0.00025 is selected to train the network.
For the H-network, the following two cases are considered.
On the one hand, in the general MI case discussed in Section
III-B1, a bidirectional RNN H-network with two hidden layers
(each with 44 LSTM cells and hyperbolic tangent activation
functions) is used. The size of the second experience replay
memory is 500 tuples and minibatches of size 64 are used.
On the other hand, in the i.i.d. case where time dependency
is ignored in calculating the MI, as discussed in Section
III-B2, the H-network is a feedforward neural network with
two hidden layers (each with 64 neurons and ReLU activation
functions). The size of the second experience replay memory is
10k tuples and minibatches of size 128 are used. In both cases,
the cross-entropy loss function is used to train the network
using the RMSProp optimizer with a learning rate equal to
0.001.
Fig. 6 presents the electricity cost versus the MI between
demand load and grid load, calculated based on the Kraskov–
Sto¨gbauer–Grassberger (KSG) estimation method (with pa-
rameter 4) [32], for both models. This figure clearly shows that
the Model II outperforms Model I for two reasons. First, with
the same electricity cost, Model II can reduce the MI more
than the Model I, which means that the statistical dependence
between the sequences yT and zT is weaker for the former
case. Second, unlike the Model I, Model II can reduce MI up
7to very small values, thus offering the possibility of achieving
practically arbitrary privacy levels. It should be noted that
Model II is more computationally demanding than Model I
in the training phase (due to the H-network required in Model
II). However, in the operating phase, the computational cost is
the same since only the Q-network is required for executing
the learned policy. Another important analysis that can be
made from Fig. 6 is the effect of using a recurrent H-network
(general MI case) compared with a feedforward H-network
(simplified i.i.d. case). As it was expected, the DDQL with a
recurrent H-network outperforms the one with a feedforward
H-network, which can be seen from the gap of the curves in
the figure. It should be added that, for values of λ close to
1, since the privacy term has a very small weight in the loss
function (see (8)), all cases provide similar results.
Fig. 6. Electricity cost versus MI between demand load and grid load for
Model I and Model II (for both a recurrent and a feedforward H-networks).
C. Deep double Q-learning versus attacker
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Model I and
Model II (using the general MI, i.e., the recurrent H-network)
in limiting an attacker trying to infer sensitive information
about the user. To this end, two practical scenarios are studied.
In the first scenario, an attacker using a neural network with
three hidden layers (each with 32 neurons and ReLU activation
functions) uses the grid load sequence zT to infer the user’s
demand load yT . In the second scenario, an attacker using a
neural network with two hidden layers (each with 44 neurons
and ReLU activation functions) uses the sequences of grid load
zT to infer the occupancy status of households. Both attackers
are trained using the RMSProp optimizer with a learning rate
equal to 0.001.
The performance of the first and second attacker versus the
electricity cost is presented in Figs. 7 and 8, respectively. From
these figures, it can be seen that Model II is more effective
in limiting the attackers since, for a given electricity cost, the
inference performance metrics are worse in both cases (the
exception, again, occurs in the regime λ ≈ 1 where no privacy
guarantees can be expected). Besides, when λ ≈ 0, both
attackers perform as expected when yT and zT are independent
random vectors. This full privacy regime can be obtained at the
Fig. 7. Electricity cost versus normalized error of attacker inferring actual
demand load for the Model I and Model II.
Fig. 8. Electricity cost versus balanced accuracy of attacker inferring
occupancy status of household for the Model I and Model II.
expense of increasing the electricity cost. For example, looking
at Fig. 8, it can be seen that by increasing the electricity cost
to more than $3/day the attacker acts like random guessing in
inferring the occupancy status of the dwelling. Note that this
amounts to more than four times the normal electricity cost
without privacy considerations.
VI. Conclusion
In this work, we study a privacy-aware SM framework
that uses an RB to hide the actual power consumption of a
household. Following the literature, the problem of finding the
optimum battery charging/discharging policy, for minimizing
information leakage with minimum additional electricity cost,
is formulated as an MDP. This MDP is tackled using a
model-free deep reinforcement learning approach, known as
the DDQL algorithm. We propose to include the MI (between
the actual power consumption and the masked reported load
to the grid) as a privacy measure in the DDQL framework by
using an H-network to estimate the required privacy signal for
training the agent. To evaluate the benefits of the proposed
algorithm, the results are compared with the case where
flatness is used as the privacy measure. The privacy-cost trade-
off based on SM data and the performance of two different
8attackers (attempting to infer sensitive information) clearly
show the advantages of the new method over the previous
proposed in the literature. In addition, an i.i.d. scenario is con-
sidered as a benchmark to show the impact of the correlations
across time in the privacy measure computation. It is shown
that, by exploiting the time dependence, there is a consistent
gain in the achieved privacy level for a given electricity cost.
Although training our MI-based model is computationally
more expensive than the others, its operating computational
cost is equal if the structure of the Q-network is the same.
Therefore, we conclude that the general DDQL-MI algorithm
is able to better exploit an RB for privacy purposes.
To wrap up the paper, we briefly comment on two possible
extensions of our work. First, it would be interesting to study
different MDP formulations, where the definition of the state
is wisely augmented, and analyze the performance gains that
can be obtained. Second, a multi-user/multi-resource extension
of this work also seems like a promising research avenue.
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